LESSON LEARNED from PAST INCIDENT REPORTS at REFINERY in BP, TEXAS, USA, prepared by U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD.

At approximately 1:20 p.m. on March 23, 2005, a series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas City refinery during the restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerization unit. Fifteen workers were killed and 180 others were injured. Many of the victims were in or around work trailers located near an atmospheric vent stack. The explosions occurred when a distillation tower flooded with hydrocarbons and was overpressurized, causing a geyser-like release from the vent stack [1].

BP, TEXAS [1]

Cloud extent comparing field observations (red line) to dispersion modeling [1]

SOURCE:

INVESTIGATION REPOR,T REFINERY EXPLOSION AND FIRE, U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD, REPORT NO. 2005-04-I-TX, MARCH 2007.

 [1]http://www.csb.gov/bp-america-refinery-explosion/

YOU TUBE

Outlines of the incident at;

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9JY3eT4cdM&list=UUXIkr0SRTnZO4_QpZozvCCA&index=47

IN DEPTH REPORTS, prepared by U.S. Chemical Safety Board at;

http://www.csb.gov/bp-america-refinery-explosion/

WORST CASE SCENARIO BUILDING

It goes without saying that thoroughly investigate the incident and reconstruct system that allows to prevent from recurrence of the incidents.

We think that it is also important to estimate affected area, based on the worst case scenario, taking into account of existing guidance such as;

U.S. EPA METHODS;

RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM GUIDANCE FOR OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

CONTENTS;

    Determining Worst-Case Scenario

       In case of Toxic Gases

       In case of Toxic Liquids

       In case of Flammable Substances

Release Rates for Toxic Substances

Estimation of Worst-Case Distance to Toxic Endpoint

Estimation of Distance to Overpressure Endpoint for Flammable Substances

[http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-facilities-risk-management-programs-rmp]

&

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND DOCUMENT FOR OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS FOR ANHYDROUS AQUEOUS AMMONIA, CHLORINE, AND SULFUR DIOXIDE

[http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/technical-background-offsite-consequence-analysis-anhydrous-ammonia-aqueous-ammonia-chlorine-and]

OUR SOLUTIONS;

For example;

Estimation for an affected area, caused by accident, associated with chemicals, usng Fluidyn PANWAVE.

PANWAVE is a module of PANACHE developed for the simulation of the consequences of total (sudden rapture of a tank) or partial leaks (breach or rapture in a branch connection) following an accident.

PANWAVE helps to simulate wave effects and to obtain the pressure of the impact on the retention walls and provides solutions to improve the retention capacity of the liquid.

In the safety directives for classified sites (SEVESO II, procedures for storage of toxic/flammable liquids), the loss of containment due to a sudden tank rupture can be correctly analyzed only by means of numerical simulation of pressure load and eventual overtopping on the storage sites. fluidyn-PANWAVE is a dedicated tool for such simulations in the chemical, petrochemical and agro industries sectors.

For more details, visit the web site at; 

 http://www.fluidyn.com/fluidyn/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=138&Itemid=119

ACCEPTABLE SEPARATION DISTANCE (ASD), a regulatory indicator in the United States to protect human and building/structure from explosion/fire, associated with chemicals.

 SOURCE:[http://www.glo.texas.gov/GLO/_documents/disaster-recovery/training/env-training/explosive-flammable.pdf], Accessed on July 5^th 

There’re two safety standards in 24 CFR Part 51, United States to calculate ASD.

1) Structures

• Thermal Radiation (fire) – 10,000 BTU /Ft. sq Hr. (31.5 kW/m²)
• Blast Overpressure (explosion) – 0.5 PSI (105 Kpa)
  
  

2) Human

• Thermal Radiation (fire) – 450 BTU/Ft. sq Hr. (1.4 kW/m²)

ASD Electronic Assessment Tool is available at;

http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/environment/asdcalculator.cfm

Just note to remind you that calculation of the ASD is the first step to assess site suitability.

SOURCE http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/environment/asdcalculator.cfm  Accessed on July 5^th

OUR SOLUTION

HS-TECH ENGINEERING Co., Ltd. provides specific solution to estimate explosion/fire damage zone through computational fluid dynamic technologies.

Please contact with;

Hashimoto, Mobile:+66(0) 91 545 4896, shinya_h@hstecheng.com

fern, Mobile :+66(0)92 223 7536, sasiton_t@hstecheng.com  (Technology Specialist)

Bee, Mobile : +66(0)91 557 9303,sunisa_t@hstecheng.com (Account & Marketing Representative)

We extended our deepest condolesences to a victim.

A victim had fatal damage on his head due to explosion.

Jennie Runevitch, WTHR reporter  said that  victim as 48-year-old Jim Gibson, died of blunt force trauma to his head due to multiple skull fractures.  

and 

According to OSHA and the U.S. Department of Labor, the plant has been fined twice for violations in the past ten years in 2009 and 2004.

[http://www.wthr.com/story/25917537/2014/07/01/injuries-reported-in-explosion-at-marion-general-motors-plant]

The Marion plant was ranked at the very bottom of GM for safety in terms of lost workdays and near-miss accidents.

[https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/07/03/mari-j03.html] 
--> The page was deleted from the web site (July 5th) Access: July 4th

Click on the PDF to open the deleted web site.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ex-76tX2OHw

[NOTE]

Overpressure is one of the key parameters to estimate severity to the body.

Metal stumping factory in General Motors, Indiana USA, was exploded and one person killed due to chlorine related chemicals etc. July 1, 2014

We extend our deepest condolences to a victim and his/her family. 

Some media said that chlorine chemical was Chlorine Dioxides.

http://www.wthr.com/story/25917537/2014/07/01/injuries-reported-in-explosion-at-marion-general-motors-plant

• Please review your manufacturing processes to avoid any repetition.
  
  

• HS-TECH ENGINEERING is able to simulate explosion in a confined or semi-confined sapace, using fluidyn VENTEX, a 3D simulation software.

[NOTE]

Characteristics of Chlorine Dioxide from Source A

Chlorine Dioxide is a powerful OXIDIZER and EXPLOSIVES on contact with CARBON MONOOXIDE, HYDROCARBONS, AMINES, MERCURY, ORGANUC MATERIALS, POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE, PHOSPHORUS, CHLORINE, SULFUR, HEAT, METALS and ALCOHOLS.

Chlorine Dioxide is sensitive to SHOCK and FRICTION and unstable in LIGHT and SUNLIGHT.

Storage of Chlorine Dioxide from Source B 

Fiberglass Reinforced vinyl ester Plastic (FRP) or High Density Linear Polyethylene (HDLPE) tanks　with no internal insulation or heat probes are recommended for bulk storage of 25 to 38 percent solution sodium chlorite.

Storage and chlorine dioxide systems typically include the following;

• Avoid storage and handling of combustible or reactive materials, such as acids or organic materials, in the sodium chlorite area.
  
  
• Inert material should be used in contact with the strong oxidizing and/or acid solutions involved in chlorine dioxide systems. 
  
  
• Chlorine dioxide solution concentrations below about 10 g/L will not produce sufficiently high vapor pressures to present an explosion hazard under most ambient conditions of temperature and pressure.
  
  
• Adequate ventilation and air monitoring. 
  
  

• Air contact with chlorine dioxide solutions should be controlled to limit the potential for explosive concentrations possibly building up within the generator.
  
  
• Chlorine dioxide concentrations in air higher than 8 to 10 percent volume should be avoided. Two methods can be applied: operation under vacuum or storage under higher positive pressure (45 to 75 psig) to prevent buildup of gas-phase ClO2 in the head space. Bulk storage (batch) tanks containing ClO2 should be suitably vented to atmosphere.

• Source A: CHLORINE DIOXIDE, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE FACT SHEET, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT  OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES, Right to Know Program, Revision: December 2005 [http://nj.gov/health/eoh/rtkweb/documents/fs/0368.pdf, accessed July 2nd 2014]
  
  

• Source B: [http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/mdbp/pdf/alter/chapt_3.pdf, accessed on July 2nd 2014]